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ON DYNAMIC CONSISTENCY IN AMBIGUOUS GAMES
ANDREW ELLIS
Abstract. I consider static, incomplete information games where players may
not be ambiguity neutral. Every player is one of a finite set of types, and each
knows her own type but not that of the other players. Ex ante, players differ only
in their taste for outcomes. If every player is dynamically consistent with respect
to her own information structure and respects Consequentialism, then players act
as if expected utility for uncertainty about types.
1. Objectives
Recently, the theory of incomplete information games (Harsanyi, 1967-8) has been
extended to allow players to exhibit uncertainty averse behavior and applied to eco-
nomic settings such as auctions, mechanism design and voting. This paper formal-
izes a modeling trade-off for such games, showing that uncertainty aversion poses
difficulties for some of expected utility’s particularly appealing properties, includ-
ing dynamic consistency (DC). The following three properties imply no player is
ambiguity averse with respect to the uncertainty about her own and other players’
types: (i) DC, i.e. a strategy optimal conditional on each of a given player’s types
is also ex ante optimal for that player; (ii) Consequentialism, i.e. each player up-
dates her preferences in a manner independent of other players’ strategy choices and
ignores counter-factual signal realizations; and (iii) common ex ante behavior, i.e.
each player has the same preferences (up to tastes) before observing her type, a
generalization of common priors.
Date: April, 2018.
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The main result is general, in that it applies to all standard models incorporating
uncertainty, and has several immediate implications for mechanism design under am-
biguity. While many of these games do not explicitly model an ex ante stage, their
interpretation typically admits an ex ante stage with (at least) a participation deci-
sion. The result suggests, for instance, that satisfaction of the ex post participation
constraints need not imply ex ante participation constraint. Furthermore, renego-
tiation may be part of the optimal contract, even when contracts are complete. In
games whose interpretation does not admit any ex ante decisions, DC is particularly
important for welfare comparisons. Violations of DC imply ex post welfare may differ
substantially from ex ante.
The result, presented formally in Section 2, implies that much of the literature
that focuses on the strategic interaction of ambiguity averse agents with incomplete
information studies agents that violate one of the three properties. For instance,
Theorem 1 shows that at least one of these properties fails in (discretized versions
of) nearly all of the literature on auctions and multi-agent mechanism design with
ambiguity aversion, including Salo and Weber (1995), Lo (1998), Bose et al. (2006),
Chen et al. (2007), Bose and Daripa (2009), Bodoh-Creed (2012), Bose and Renou
(2014), Ellis (2016), and Renou (2015).1 In other contexts, various authors have
explored agents that explicitly violate either DC or Consequentialism; for instance,
Baliga et al. (2013) study polarization and ambiguity by maintaining DC but relaxing
Consequentialism. The results also provide restrictions on the ex ante behavior of
agents in non-strategic interactions with uncertainty, such as the general equilibrium
model of Condie and Ganguli (2011).
While it is well-known that requiring DC for all information structures poses diffi-
culties for ambiguity sensitive models, the approach pioneered by Sarin and Wakker
(1998) and Epstein and Schneider (2003b) requires DC to hold only for a particular
information structure.2 In a single player decision problem with fixed information,
1While non-discretized versions of the above papers are not covered by the result, it is easy to see
that DC fails for the common sets of priors implicitly or explicitly assumed for the agents in those
papers as well. The sets of priors in these papers have a product structure that fails rectangularity,
as noted by Epstein and Schneider (2003a).
2See e.g. Epstein and Le Breton (1993), Ghirardato (2002), and the debate between Al-Najjar and
Weinstein (2009) and Siniscalchi (2009).
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they provide conditions that permit DC as well as a non-trivial role for ambiguity.
The fixed information assumption also applies in the strategic settings considered
here, but the results herein show that the conditions are much more restrictive when
combined with the analog of common priors.
Section 3 discusses the assumptions and alternative approaches. The trade-off
is tight, in that there are examples that satisfy any two of the three key assump-
tions. Thus, given common ex ante behavior, the modeler faces the familiar trade-off
between Consequentialism and DC. On the one hand, DC can be maintained by
allowing the update rule to depend on the equilibrium strategy profile, e.g. Hanany
and Klibanoff (2007). Hanany et al. (2016) develop an equilibrium concept based on
this idea for games when players have smooth ambiguity preferences (Klibanoff et al.,
2005), for which there is no issue with ex ante versus ex post for choice, equilibrium,
or welfare. In the games considered by the present paper, their solution concept
reduces to solving the (ex ante) normal form.3
On the other hand, while DC has very strong normative appeal, violations thereof
are well documented. The experimental literature has provided some insights into
how conflicts between Consequentialism and DC are resolved. For instance, Maher
and Kashima (1997), Cohen et al. (2000), and Dominiak et al. (2012) study dynamic
behavior in an Ellsberg-style experiment, albeit in non-strategic settings.4 All find
support for non-DC update rules. The last of the three explicitly tests DC against
Consequentialism in an experiment where the two make conflicting predictions. They
find that more subjects satisfy Consequentialism than DC.
Common priors itself is an ubiquitous, if sometimes controversial, assumption in
incomplete information games. It requires that differences in beliefs are entirely
due to to information. A number of classic results in information economics depend
critically on common priors, so understanding the corresponding assumption’s impli-
cations is of interest. A drawback of this paper’s results is that its analog, common
ex ante behavior, implies that both perception of and attitude towards uncertainty
3Their setting is richer in that they allow sequential moves, and in these cases, the reduction to
normal form need not obtain. In particular, they consider the appropriate analog to sequential
equilibrium for this setting.
4Recently, Li et al. (2017) find evidence for non-expected utility behavior in strategic settings,
though in a setting with complete information.
ON DYNAMIC CONSISTENCY IN AMBIGUOUS GAMES 4
are identical. Justifications for common priors typically apply to the former but not
the latter. A full analysis of the best way to relax common ex ante behavior as above
is beyond the scope of this paper, but in Appendix B an extension of the main result
to the α-maxmin expected utility model is provided.
2. Model and Results
Following Harsanyi (1967-8), I model incomplete information games as follows;
for related formulations with ambiguity aversion, see e.g. Lo (1999), Kajii and Ui
(2005), or Azrieli and Teper (2011). Let I = {1, ..., n} with n ≥ 2 be the set of
players, T0 be a finite set of states of nature, Ti be a finite set of types of player i
where #Ti ≥ 2 for all i > 0, and T = T0 × T1 × ... × Tn be the set of states of the
world. As is standard, denote T−i = T0 × ...× Ti−1 × Ti+1 × ...× Tn and (ti, t′−i) for
the state where Player i’s type is ti and the type of Player j 6= i is t′j. The space
of outcomes of the game is a convex set X, such as the set of lotteries over action
profiles. It will sometimes be convenient to write ∆Z for the set of all finite support
probability measures on a set Z with an appropriate σ-algebra. As standard, Player
i learns her type before choosing a strategy.5
I abstract away from the formal details of the game and equilibrium. Instead, I
consider each player’s preference over acts that map T to X. Every pair of a strategy
profile and a mechanism or game with the above information structure maps to one
such an act. Denote player i’s ex ante preference over acts by i0 and her preference
conditional on learning that her type is ti ∈ Ti by iti . Each 
i
ti
and i0 are complete
and transitive, and i0 has a utility representation U i0(·).
2.1. Assumptions. I impose three assumptions on each player’s family of prefer-
ence relations, and one assumption that links preferences across players. Section 3
discusses their importance for the result, their appeal in a game theoretic setting,
and some reasons why one might relax each.
Assumption 1 (Consequentialism). For every i ∈ I and every ti ∈ Ti, if f(ti, t−i) =
g(ti, t−i) for all t−i ∈ T−i, then f ∼iti g.
5Formally, the information of Player i is modeled as a filtration F i = {F0,F i1} where F0 = {T}
and F i1 = {T0 × T1 × ...× Ti−1 × {t} × Ti+1 × ...× Tn : t ∈ Ti}.
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Assumption 2 (Dynamic Consistency). For every i ∈ I, if f iti g for all ti ∈ Ti,
then f i0 g. If in addition there exists t′i ∈ Ti such that f it′i g, then f 
i
0 g.
Assumption 3 (Full Support). For all i ∈ I, any f ∈ F and any t ∈ T , there exist
outcomes x, y ∈ X such that fx i0 fy where fw(t′) equals w when t′ = t and equals
f(t′) otherwise for w = x, y.
The first two assumptions are adapted from Epstein and Schneider (2003b), and
the third is ubiquitous in the work on updating to avoid conditioning on a null event.
Consequentialism implies that each player cares only about the outcomes in states
that agree with her information.6 DC says that if player i knows she will prefer f
to g regardless of the signal she receives, then she prefers f to g ex ante as well.
In contrast to Ghirardato (2002) or Epstein and Le Breton (1993), this version of
DC applies only to the particular information structure in the game considered. By
themselves, these assumptions do not restrict the perception of ambiguity perceived
by player i about her own type. In fact, the results of Epstein and Schneider (2003b)
imply that for any set of marginal probability distributions over Ti, there exists a
DM satisfying the above assumptions for set of priors with that set of marginals.
Our next assumption explicitly uses the structure imposed by the game.
Assumption 4 (Common Ex Ante Behavior). There exists an interval B ⊆ R, a
continuous U0 : BT → R, and a family of continuous, onto functions {ui : X → B}ni=1
so that U i0(f) = U0(ui ◦ f) for all i and all f .
This assumption generalizes the common prior assumption typical of expected
utility. In fact, whenever U0(·) is an expected utility function, Common Ex Ante
Behavior holds if and only if the priors are identical and the range of each ui is
the same. The normalization that the range of every ui is the same is harmless if
U0 is maxmin expected utility, but may entail some loss of generality with other
models of ambiguity aversion. Note also that every paper in mechanism design or
auction theory cited above has quasi-linear utility, implying that the range of each
ui(·) equals R.
6Because of this assumption, one could have defined ex post preference on acts that depend only
on the states consistent with received information. I opt not to do so for notational ease.
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It is easy to verify that Common Ex Ante Behavior allows for players whose ex




• U0(ψ) = minp∈C
´
ψdp (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989, henceforth, MEU)
• U0(ψ) = αminp∈C
´







ψdp)µ(dp), µ ∈ ∆(∆T ) (Klibanoff et al., 2005).
In any of these models, one can easily state Common Ex Ante Behavior solely in
terms of the preference relation.
2.2. Results. The main result shows that under the assumptions, players do not
exhibit Ellsberg behavior – that is, violations of Savage (1954)’s sure thing principle
– when the actions considered depend only on the type profile. To state it, say
that an act f does not depend on Nature’s type if f is f(τ0, t−i) = f(τ ′0, t−i) for all
τ0, τ
′
0 ∈ T0 and t−i ∈ T−i.7 Then, the type of every player suffices to determine its
outcome. The result shows that the DM acts as if expected utility over these acts.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1-4, for uncertainty about players’ types, each
player is additive. That is, for any i ∈ I there are continuous functions {vt}t∈T such
that for any acts f, g that do not depend on Nature’s type:







Additivity immediately rules out violations of the sure thing principle and other
anomalies for expected utility. Hence, DC and common ex ante behavior greatly
limit the scope for ambiguity in games. No ambiguity is perceived about the types
of players, only about Nature’s type.
To provide an intuition, the following specializes the result to the case of MEU
with a common set of priors.
Corollary 1. If players satisfy Assumptions 1-4 and U0 is MEU with set of priors
Π, then for any t−0 ∈ T−0 and any π, π′ ∈ Π, π(T0 × {t−0}) = π′(T0 × {t−0}).
As is well known, an MEU player satisfies DC and Consequentialism only if her set
of priors is rectangular (Epstein and Schneider, 2003b) with respect to her own signal.
7Equivalently, f is measurable with respect to the algebra {∅, T0} ×
∏n
i=1 2Ti .
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Since all players have the same set of priors, the set must in fact be rectangular with
respect to every player’s signal. This is a demanding condition that forces the set of
priors to collapse to a singleton set over the players’ types. In fact, the priors have a
very particular structure: there exists a probability measure q ∈ ∆T−0 and a closed,
convex Πt−0 ⊂ ∆(T0 × {t−0}) for every t−0 ∈ T−0 so that Π equals ∑
t−0∈T−0
q(t−0)πt−0(·) : πt−0 ∈ Πt−0∀t−0 ∈ T−0
 .
Players have a common prior, q, about the distribution of the other players’ types.
Indeed, if Nature has no types, i.e. T0 is a singleton, then each is actually (state
independent) subjective expected utility.8
The proof relies on tools developed by Gorman (1968) that have had numerous
applications in economics.9 As noted in Epstein and Seo (2011), DC with respect to
a partition and Consequentialism implies that each cell has a property that Gorman
calls Separability.10 Epstein and Seo show that exchangeable models have separable
singletons, implying an additive representation. In the present paper, no such ex-
changeability exists, and singletons need not be separable when T0 is not a singleton.
Instead, a second result of Gorman is applied to show that the representation must
be additive on “components” of the state space which include all sets of the form
T0 × {t−0}.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied. By construction, U0
satisfies Gorman (1968)’s P1 and P2. Full support implies Gorman’s P4 (which
implies his P3). For any E ⊂ T and f, g ∈ BT , define fEg by the element of BT so
that fEg(t) = f(t) if t ∈ E and fEg(t) = g(t) if t /∈ E. A set E ⊂ T is separable if
8A similar result holds when U0 is Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) (Schmeidler, 1989), i.e. there
exist a probability measure q over T−0 and capacities νt−0 over T0 for each t−0 ∈ T−0 so that the
capacity the capacity ν =
∑
t−0
q(t−0)νt−0(·). This is a further corollary not only of Theorem 1 but
also of Sarin and Wakker (1998), who show that a CEU DM satisfies DC only if it is additive at
the first stage, i.e. over each player’s type.
9See e.g. Wakker (1989), Epstein and Seo (2011) and Mongin and Pivato (2015).
10To keep the paper self-contained, the appendix includes statements of Gorman’s theorems used
in the proof.
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for any x, y, z, z′ ∈ BT ,
U0(xEz) ≥ U0(yEz) ⇐⇒ U0(xEz′) ≥ U0(yEz′).
Consequentialism and DC imply that every set of the form {t : ti = τ} for any τ ∈ Ti
is separable.
Say that A,E ⊆ T overlap if they intersect and neither contains the other. Gor-
man’s Theorem 1 states that if A,E ⊆ T overlap and are separable, A⋃E is sepa-
rable. For each t ∈ T−0, define
Qt = {τ ∈ T : ti 6= τi for all i > 0}.
For any t̂ ∈ T−0, I claim Qt̂ is separable. Fix arbitrary t̂ ∈ T−0 and set N =∏n
i=1(#Ti − 1) and order the player-type pairs via n : {1, ..., N} → I and τ :
{1, ..., N} → ∪i∈ITi with the following properties: (i) for i ∈ I, n(i) = i; (ii) for
all k, τ(k) ∈ Tn(k); and (iii) for every i, {τ(k) : n(k) = i} = Ti \ t̂i. That is: (i) the
first I players listed by n are all distinct, (ii) τ(k) is a possible type for player n(k),
and (iii) for player i, all types of i except t̂i occur exactly once.
Let A0 = ∅ and for every k ∈ {1, ...., N}, define
Ek = {t : tn(k) = τ(k)}
and
Ak = ∪kk′=1Ek = Ak−1 ∪ Ek.
Every Ak is separable. Clearly A1 = E1 is separable by the above. Suppose that
Ak−1 is separable for k > 1. If Ak−1 and Ek overlap, then Gorman’s Theorem 1
implies that Ak is separable. Ak−1 ∩ Ek 6= ∅ since it contains t1 where t1n(k) = τ(k)
and t1i = τ(i) for all i ∈ I \ n(k), t1 ∈ Ak−1 ∩ Ek for t0 ∈ T0. Ek 6⊂ Ak−1 because t2
with t2n(k) = τ(k) and t2i = t̂i for all i ∈ I \ n(k) belongs to Ek but not Ak−1. Finally,
Ak−1 6⊂ Ek since t3 with t3n(k) = t̂n(k) and t3ī = τ (̄i) for ī = min I \ {n(k)} belongs
to Ak−1 but not Ek. Thus the sets overlap, and successive application yields that
AN = Qt̂ is separable.
Say that A ⊂ T is a top element if A 6= T , A is separable, and the only sep-
arable E ⊃ A without equality is T itself. Let B = {C1, ..., Cm} be the set of
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top elements. Fix distinct t, t′ ∈ T−0 and let Ct, Ct
′ ∈ B contain Qt, Qt′ respec-
tively. Note Qt
⋃
Qt′ = T so if Qt′ ⊂ Ct, then Ct = T , a contradiction. Hence
Ct 6= Ct′ . Now, Ct ⋂Ct′ 6= ∅ so, combining with #T−0 ≥ 4, #B ≥ 4, conclude
B satisfies the hypothesis of Gorman’s Theorem 2. Applying the result and noting
T0 × {t} =
⋃ {T \ Ci : Qt ⊆ Ci, Ci ∈ B} obtains the desired representation. 
3. Discussion
This section discusses the content of the assumptions within a game theoretic
context and argues that all of them are important for the result to hold.
Full-support ensures all type profiles are viewed as possible, and rules out that
one can reduce a multi-agent problem to a single agent one.11 For instance, suppose
that T1 = T2 = {R,B} and that U0 is MEU. If the set of priors equals
Π = {π(RR) = p and π(BB) = 1− p : p ∈ [p, p̄]}
then all players satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, and 4. However, each violates full support,
and at the interim stage, each is certain of the type of the other.
Consequentialism relates closely to sequential reasoning in games, requiring that
each player’s preference is determined entirely by the histories possible given her
current information. In this paper, different information sets are reached by virtue
of Nature’s choice as opposed to that of other players, so a player’s realized type
reveals nothing about the strategy played by others. As is explicit in Hanany et al.
(2016) and implicit herein, players know (believe with probability 1) the strategy
profile of others. Thus, each player need only update her beliefs about types of other
players and the parameters of the game, not their opponents’ strategies.
In dynamic incomplete information games, Consequentialism may be less appeal-
ing, especially off the equilibrium path. In these information sets, knowledge of the
strategy profile is no longer assured. For instance, if a player engages in forward-
induction reasoning (e.g. Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986), then she violates Consequen-
tialism. Specifically, she uses their incentives in unrealized parts of the game tree to
update her beliefs about the actions taken by her opponents after finding herself in
11Of course, one can make assumptions weaker than full support that rule such behavior out.
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an unexpected information set; see e.g. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002). Consequen-
tialism requires that only incentives and strategies within the realized information
set matter for her choice.
Hanany et al. (2016) provide a framework compatible with appropriate versions of
Assumptions 2, 3, 4 and the Smooth Ambiguity Model by relaxing Consequentialism.
At the interim stage, Player i maximizes a preference that depends both on her infor-
mation and the equilibrium strategy profile. Specifically, the second-order belief over
types is updated via the “smooth rule,” which ensures that DC holds but depends
on the entire strategy profile, including the player’s ex ante expectation of her own
choice in the current information set. In contrast, Consequentialism does not allow
one’s previous expectation of her own choice to determine her updated second-order
beliefs. If DC is critical for a particular application, then adopting their framework
provides a way out of the impossibility result presented here.
DC requires that no player has an incentive to deviate from her ex ante optimal
strategy upon learning her type. This is the property that permits reduction of the
strategic form to the normal form. Modeling players who fail to satisfy DC requires
one to make assumptions regarding their sophistication (see e.g. Siniscalchi, 2011).
Moreover, the economic interpretation of many games, especially in mechanism de-
sign problems, admits at least two stages at which decisions are made. In such
contexts, failure of DC has consequences for the optimal mechanism, including the
aforementioned examples of the renegotiation and participation decisions. Of course,
if players are completely naive or if the ex ante stage does not actually occur, then
DC may not be a necessary property.
As noted, Common Ex Ante Behavior is the analog of the common priors assump-
tion under SEU. Common priors captures the idea that in the absence of differential
information, i.e. at the ex ante stage, there is no reason for the players to have
different beliefs. It is a routinely invoked in incomplete information games dating to
Harsanyi (1967-8) that has methodological and normative appeal. For instance, it
provides modeling discipline that isolates the effects of asymmetric information, and
evaluating expected welfare from a particular game without it is difficult because
one must take a position on which prior to use. Nonetheless it has generated some
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controversy – see Morris (1995), Aumann (1998), and Gul (1998) for arguments both
for and against it.12
Adapted to non-expected utility, the arguments in favor imply that the perception
of uncertainty should be the same for all players, but Common Ex Ante Behavior
implies that both perception of and attitude towards uncertainty are identical. The
classic arguments for common priors do not apply to the latter. While a full discus-
sion of how best to relax it is left for future work, I analyze incomplete information
games where players have (α,C)-MEU preferences in Appendix B. The (α,C)-MEU
model makes a parametric separation between perception of uncertainty (the set of
priors C) and attitude towards ambiguity (the index α).13 I relax Common Ex Ante
Behavior by requiring that players have the same set of priors but allow them to have
different α parameters. Under the other assumptions of Theorem 1, this implies that
the common set of priors must have the same structure as in Corollary 1. That is,
they have a common, single prior over the distribution of player’s types. This sup-
ports, but by no means confirms, the intuition that the trade-off between DC and
Consequentialism applies when players have a common perception of uncertainty
rather than only those with Common Ex Ante Behavior.
Appendix A. Statements of Gorman’s Theorems
P1, P2 and P4 of Gorman (1968), adapted to a preference % on XT , are that:14
P1: % is complete, transitive, and continuous.
P2: X is topologically separable and arc connected.
P4: For any t ∈ T and x ∈ XT , there exist y, z ∈ X s.t. (y, x−t)  (z, x−t).
12For instance, Gul argues that either the ex ante stage either is a real point in time and thus
common priors has strong bite, or else is a fictitious modeling device and that what matters for
analyzing the game is each player’s actions conditional on her realized type. In the latter case,
what matters is where in the universal type space the player lies, and the possible types need not
be consistent with any common prior.
13The extent to which the separation obtains has generated controversy in the literature, as there
may exist distinct (α,C) and (β,D) representing the same preference. See Ghirardato et al. (2004)
(henceforth, GMM) and the corrections by Eichberger et al. (2011) for discussion and interpretation,
and Theorem 4.1 of Klibanoff et al. (2014) for a setting in which there is a unique set of “relevant”
priors. Remark 1 discusses other models that obtain the separation.
14P3 is implied by P4 and hence omitted.
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Under these conditions, there exists a continuous utility function U that represents
%. An event E is separable if for any x, y, x′, y′ ∈ XT such that x(t) = y(t) and
x′(t) = y′(t) for all t /∈ E, x % y ⇐⇒ x′ % y′. The subsets A,A′ ⊂ T overlap if
A
⋂
A′ 6= ∅, A 6⊆ A′, and A′ 6⊆ A.
The clauses of the following theorems not used by the proofs are omitted.
Theorem (Gorman, 1968, Theorem 1). Under P1, P2 and P4, if A,A′ ⊆ T overlap
and are separable, then A ∪ A′ and A ∩ A′ are separable.
For a vector ψ ∈ XT and E ⊂ T , let ψE be its projection onto XE. Recall A ⊂ T
is a top element if A 6= T , A is separable, and the only separable E ⊃ A without
equality is T itself.
Theorem (Gorman, 1968, Theorem 2). For m ≥ 3, let B = {C1, ..., Cm} be the
collection of top elements and Ej = T \ Cj for each j. Under P1, P2 and P4,
if two distinct elements of B intersect, then {E1, . . . , Em} is a partition of T and
U(ψ) = ∑mj=1 Uj(ψEj ), perhaps after a normalization.
See Gorman (1968) for proofs.
Appendix B. Relaxing Common Ex Ante Behavior with α-MEU
In this section of the Appendix, I relax Common Ex Ante Behavior in the (α,C)-
MEU model and argue that the result extends. Recall that a player has a (αi, C)-
MEU representation for αi ∈ [0, 1] and a closed, convex C ⊆ ∆(T ) if her preference
is represented by
U i0(ui ◦ f) = αi min
p∈C
ˆ




Intuitively, C represents perception of ambiguity and α represents the agents attitude
towards that ambiguity, with a lower α reflecting more uncertainty averse behavior.15
Formally, I relax Common Ex Ante Behavior as follows.
Assumption 5. There exist sets C,Ct ⊂ ∆T and an αi ∈ [0, 1] \ {12} for every i ∈ I
such that for all i ∈ I:
15This correspondence is not is exact because the representation is not unique. Lemma 1 shows
that if (α,C) and (β,D) represent the same preference and α = β, then C = D.
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(i) i0 has a (αi, C)-MEU representation, and
(ii) iti has a (αi, Cti)-MEU representation for each ti ∈ Ti.
Because C is constant across players, each perceives the same ambiguity ex ante.
The posterior beliefs, Cti , must relate to C through DC. A necessary, but not suffi-
cient, condition for DC and Consequentialism is that Cti results from prior-by-prior
Bayesian updating of C (Lemma 2). However, the attitude towards ambiguity, αi,
may vary from player to player. Thus players have the same perception of ambiguity
but differ in their attitude towards it.
I show that replacing Common Ex Ante Behavior with the above assumption
implies existence of a common prior over players’ types.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 5, for any t ∈ T−0 and any π, π′ ∈ C,
π(T0 × {t}) = π′(T0 × {t}).
The result suggests that common perception of uncertainty, as opposed to common
attitude towards ambiguity, drives the impossibility result. To prove the result, I
show that if an event is separable, in the sense of Gorman, for an (αi, C)-MEU
DM, then it also is separable for a (1, C)-MEU DM. The result then follows from
applying Corollary 1 to the hypothetical game where all players are (1, C)-MEU and
so Common Ex Ante Behavior is satisfied.
Remark 1. A number of other models also feature a parametric separation between
perception of and attitude towards uncertainty. Of them, Klibanoff et al. (2009)
has a well-understood dynamic extension. However, its functional form depends on
the information structure of the agent and cannot be generated by simply altering
the index of ambiguity aversion or the second order prior. The general case of
Gajdos et al. (2008), wherein a DM maps a primitive “probability-possibility” sets
of priors to a subjective set of priors used to evaluate acts as in MEU, has enough
degrees of freedom to allow the same probability-possibility set of priors and DC.
For instance, one can take it to be the entire simplex, and then have each player
map it to an appropriate rectangular set of priors. In neither case are the differences
between individuals naturally interpretable solely in terms of their attitudes towards
uncertainty. Other models that provide the separation either do not have well-
understood dynamic extensions, such as Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011), or rely on a
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particular state space structure, such as Klibanoff et al. (2014). As noted in the
introduction, a full analysis of the best way to relax common ex ante behavior is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Proof of Theorem 2. As in Theorem 1, identify acts with real vectors. To save space,
for any measure p over all subsets of T and vector f ∈ RT , write p(f) for
´
fdp. For
any measure p and event E define another measure pE by pE(A) = p(A ∩ E).16
I first prove two Lemmas. The first shows that fixing an αi 6= 12 (and tastes), the
resulting set of priors C is unique.
Lemma 1. If a preference  has both (α, C)-MEU and (α,D)-MEU representations
for closed, convex C,D ⊆ ∆T and α 6= 12 , then C = D.
Proof. The following adapts part of the proof of Proposition 20 in GMM. It is without
loss to renormalize so that both preferences have the same utility index u. If C 6=
D, then one can use a separating hyperplane theorem to pick ϕ ∈ RT such that
c̄ = maxp∈C p(ϕ) 6= maxp∈D p(ϕ) = d̄. Define minp∈C p(ϕ) = c and minp∈D p(ϕ) = d.
Since the two representations assign the same certainty equivalent to any act f with
u ◦ f = ϕ,
αc+ (1− α)c̄ = αd+ (1− α)d̄,
and also for any act f ′ with u ◦ f ′ = −ϕ, implying that
−αc̄− (1− α)c = −αd̄− (1− α)d.
Combining yields that d̄+d = c̄+c and (1−2α)[d̄−d] = (1−2α)[c̄−c]. Since α 6= 12 ,
these can hold only if d̄ = c̄, contradicting that maxp∈C p(ϕ) 6= maxp∈D p(ϕ). 
Now, I show that C is rectangular with respect to each player’s partition. One
implication of Lemma 2 is that rectangular priors is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for DC and Consequentialism in the (α,C)-MEU model.
Lemma 2. Assumptions 1-3 and 5 imply that for any i ∈ I and τi ∈ Ti, the event
{t ∈ T : ti = τi} is separable for ′, when ′ has a (1, C)-MEU representation.
Proof of Lemma 2. The result is trivial if αi ∈ {0, 1}, so consider only α ≡ αi 6=
0, 1, 12 . Fix arbitrary i ∈ I and τi ∈ Ti, and let V represent 
i
0, Vi,τi represent iτi ,
16Note pE may not be a probability measure even if p is.
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and E = {t ∈ T : ti = τi}. Consider any f ∈ RT+. Note fE0 ∼i0 Vi,τi(f)E0 and
fE0 i0 xE0 if and only if Vi,τi(f) ≥ x. Since Vi,τi(f) ≥ 0
V (fE0) = αmin
p∈C
pE(f) + (1− α) max
p∈C
pE(f)
= V (Vi,τi(f)E0) = [αmin
p∈C
p(E) + (1− α) max
p∈C
p(E)]Vi,τi(f)





: p ∈ C
}
gives an (α,C∗τi)-MEU representation of 
i
τi
.17 Applying Lemma 1 gives that C∗τi =
Cτi (the argument above goes through even if there exists µ ∈ C∗τi with µ(T ) < 1) for
each τi. This requires that p(E) = p∗ for all p ∈ C and thus Cτi = {p(·|E) : p ∈ C}.
Now for an arbitrary g,
V (g) = V (Vi,τi(g)Eg) =αmin
p∈C
[p∗Vi,τi(g) + (1− p∗)p(g|Ec)]
+ (1− α) max
p∈C
[p∗Vi,τi(g) + (1− p∗)p(g|Ec)]
=p∗[αmin
q∈C














D = {p∗q(·|E) + (1− p∗)q′(·|Ec) : q, q′ ∈ C}.
Thus i0 has both (α,C)-MEU and (α,D)-MEU representations. Lemma 1 implies
D = C. Applying Epstein and Schneider (2003b) yields that E is ′-separable. 
Using Lemma 2, C must be rectangular with respect to each player’s filtration.
One can then apply Corollary 1 to obtain the desired conclusion. 
17This extends to any vector f , since if Vi,τi(f) < 0, we can find k ∈ R so that Vi,τi(f + k) ≥ 0 and
use the identity Vi,τi(f) = Vi,τi(f + k)− k.
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